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Abstract The present study examined whether adults
with high functioning autism (HFA) showed greater diffi-
culties in (1) their self-reported ability to empathise with
others and/or (2) their ability to read mental states in oth-
ers’ eyes than adults with Asperger syndrome (AS). The
Empathy Quotient (EQ) and ‘Reading the Mind in the
Eyes’ Test (Eyes Test) were compared in 43 adults with AS
and 43 adults with HFA. No significant difference was
observed on EQ score between groups, while adults with
AS performed significantly better on the Eyes Test than
those with HFA. This suggests that adults with HFA may
need more support, particularly in mentalizing and com-
plex emotion recognition, and raises questions about the
existence of subgroups within autism spectrum conditions.
Keywords Autism  Asperger  Empathy  Emotion 
DSM-5
Introduction
Autism spectrum conditions (ASC) are complex and per-
vasive neurodevelopmental conditions associated with
lifelong difficulties across social, emotional, and beha-
vioural domains (Amaral et al. 2008; Groen et al. 2008; Lai
et al. 2013). In recent years, however, the conceptualisation
of ASC has changed. The latest edition of the Diagnostic
and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5; APA
2013) has removed the previously discrete diagnostic pre-
sentations of Pervasive Developmental Disorders, includ-
ing Pervasive Developmental Disorder—Not Otherwise
Specified (PDD-NOS), Asperger’s disorder and autistic
disorder, and subsumed them within one broader, ‘Autism
Spectrum Disorder’ (ASD) diagnosis (here, we use Autism
Spectrum Conditions (ASC), instead of ASD, and Asperger
syndrome (AS) instead of Asperger’s disorder, seeing these
terms as synonymous but with ASC and AS as less stig-
matising). The World Health Organisation has not yet
proposed to do the same in their planned 2017 revision of
the International Classification of Diseases (ICD) manual
and so the two international diagnostic manuals currently
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contradict one another. This shift has raised questions as to
how ASC are conceptualised; whether a move towards a
single broader diagnostic category better reflects natural
kinds and, if not, whether this broader categorisation is
clinically useful.
Two subgroups that are often grouped together in
research designs and clinical service provision are AS and
high functioning autism (HFA). AS was a previously dis-
crete diagnosis in the fourth edition of the DSM (DSM-IV;
APA 2000), and remains one in the current edition of the
ICD (ICD-10; WHO 1994), separated primarily due to the
core feature of typical language acquisition. HFA is a term
used to describe the clinical presentation of autism without
any additional intellectual disability and is not a term used
in either the DSM or the ICD. It is, however, a widely used
clinical diagnosis to identify individuals on the autistic
spectrum who had a history of language delay but do not
have the associated difficulties of an intellectual
impairment.
The similarities between AS and HFA are well docu-
mented. Both conditions present with varying degrees of
difficulty in social communication alongside the presence
of unusually narrow interests, resistance to change, and
highly repetitive behaviours (Volkmar and Partland 2014).
Furthermore, group differences between HFA and AS have
been argued to be predominantly associated with level of
intelligence (Witwer and Lecavalier 2008). Research does,
however, suggest that these subgroups may be distinct from
one another across other features central to the conceptu-
alisation of ASC (Howlin 2003; Pina-Camacho et al. 2013).
There are relatively few studies exploring these differences
(Matson and Boisjoli 2008; Planche and Lemonnier 2012)
and the results are often contradictory (Lai et al. 2015). In
response to changes within the DSM-5, Tsai and Ghazi-
uddin’s (2014) literature review of comparative studies
showed 4 studies concluding that no significant differences
exist between HFA and AS, 2 studies concluding that AS
was a distinct subgroup of ASC, and 4 studies concluding
that there was insufficient support for the removal of AS
from DSM-5 at this stage. These conflicting data have
limited our ability to draw conclusions as to whether AS
and HFA are distinct conditions.
From a cognitive perspective, there is some evidence
that people with AS may have superior verbal (VIQ) over
performance intelligence (PIQ) while the opposite is the
case in those with HFA (Planche and Lemonnier 2012).
This is perhaps unsurprising given the atypical language
development in HFA, however, the profile is not consis-
tently demonstrated. Multiple studies have found no dif-
ference in VIQ between the groups (Spek et al. 2008;
Wilson et al. 2014) and other studies show a mixed profile
based on individual strengths and difficulties, the pattern of
which is not consistent enough to enable diagnostic
categorisation (Ghaziuddin and Mountain-Kimchi 2004;
Williams et al. 2008). There is, however, growing evidence
to suggest that the two conditions can be distinguished at the
neuroanatomical level. A meta-analysis of magnetic reso-
nance imaging (MRI) studies of the neuroanatomy of peo-
ple with AS compared to people with HFA, using voxel-
based morphometry, found significant differences in grey
matter volume between the groups with distinct distribution
patterns (Yu et al. 2011). Although a systematic review of
structural MRI data suggested a less clear distinction (Pina-
Camacho et al. 2013), the authors concluded that, on the
basis of available evidence, it may be too soon to remove
different subgroups of ASC from diagnostic manuals as
fundamental differences could exist. Indeed, a recent study
from our group showed that in male adults with ASC, those
with versus without language delay partly differed in terms
of brain structure (Lai et al. 2015). This suggests that sub-
suming these two subgroups into a single over-arching
diagnostic category may risk masking the subtle differences
in development and outcome (Lai et al. 2013).
There is a lack of research exploring the possible dif-
ferences in social and emotional processing between peo-
ple with AS and HFA, despite the importance of this area
in informing clinical practice (Palmen et al. 2012). Social
difficulties are arguably the most prominent and easily
measured ASC trait (Schultz 2005). One hypothesis is that
these difficulties are underpinned by a ‘theory of mind’
impairment or a ‘mindblindness’ (Baron-Cohen 1995).
Theory of mind refers to the ability to attribute mental
states to oneself and others and includes the ability to
understand that it is possible for others to hold thoughts and
beliefs that are different from your own (Baron-Cohen
et al. 1985; Premack and Woodruff 1978). A theory of
mind impairment therefore leads to core social difficulties
in guessing how others may feel in a given situation and
subsequent difficulties in understanding and interpreting
social cues.
Research consistently shows that children with ASC
develop theory of mind skills later than children who are
developing typically and that some people with ASC never
acquire a truly implicit theory of mind (Lai et al. 2013;
Scheeren et al. 2013). There is also evidence to suggest
differences in the development of theory of mind in chil-
dren with AS compared to children with HFA. Ozonoff
et al. (1991) found that children with AS outperformed
children with HFA on first-order false belief tasks; sug-
gesting a difference in theory of mind skills between these
two subgroups of ASC. Paynter and Peterson (2010) also
found theory of mind was significantly more impaired in
children with HFA aged 5–12 years of age, compared to
children with AS.
Theory of Mind is central to the development of another
neurocognitive construct; empathy. The hypothesis of ASC
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being associated with difficulties in empathising extends
the theory of mind hypothesis by considering the impact of
this mindblindness on the ability to respond appropriately
to emotions in others (Baron-Cohen 2002). Empathy is
therefore not viewed as a unitary concept, it comprises both
cognitive components and affective components (Suck-
smith et al. 2013). Interestingly, there is growing evidence
to suggest that people with ASC may show greater diffi-
culties with cognitive empathy (the ability to correctly
identify other people’s feelings or beliefs and understand
the reasons for these) than affective empathy (the ability to
offer an appropriate emotional response to another person’s
mental state) (Baron-Cohen 2011; Mazza et al. 2014).
Theory of mind and empathy difficulties underpin the
social and communicative difficulties seen in ASC and have
an impact on the formation of positive social relationships
and interactions (Goldstein and Winner 2012). Atypical
social interaction is consistently reported as being one of the
earliest observable ASC traits and has been demonstrated in
infancy, even before formal diagnosis would be possible
(Bedford et al. 2012; McConnell 2002; Rogers 2009).
Furthermore, this phenotype is almost exclusively observed
in ASC and is not characteristic of other developmental
conditions (Schultz 2005). The majority of studies explor-
ing social difficulties to date have focused on child popu-
lations, meaning that patterns of social difficulties in later
life are not as well understood (Kaland 2011). Even fewer
studies have explored social cognition differences between
adults with HFA versus AS, but differences in this feature
may be an important clinical reason for keeping AS distinct
from HFA (Pina-Camacho et al. 2013).
Ghaziuddin (2010) explored social interaction in 39
children with HFA compared to 58 children with AS and
reported significantly different social profiles between the
groups. Using Wing and Gould’s (1979) social impairment
profiles, 79 % of children with AS were rated as being
‘active but odd’ whereas 82 % of children with HFA were
identified as falling within the ‘aloof and passive’ category.
These findings demonstrate significantly different social
profiles in children with HFA compared to children with
AS. In adulthood, people with AS have also been shown to
have a more ‘active but odd’ social profile than people with
HFA who, as with childhood populations, show a more
passive social profile (Ghaziuddin 2010).
An active profile will increase social experiences which
may in turn increase the opportunity for social difficulties
to arise. This difference between adults with AS and HFA
may therefore have important clinical implications
(Ghaziuddin 2010). Recent studies have shown experiences
of suicidal ideation to be more than nine times higher in
adults with AS than in the general population in England
(Cassidy et al. 2014). This finding in AS populations
specifically may be influenced by the degree of insight into
social difficulties. Gotham et al. (2014) reported a rela-
tionship between a person’s own perception of their aut-
ism-related difficulties and depressive symptoms,
regardless of the objectively assessed degree of impair-
ment. This suggests that insight into difficulties is a more
influential factor in the development of depression than
actual social ability. The active but odd social presentation
associated with AS may also make this group, in particular,
at greater risk of social difficulties and low mood.
Positive social experiences and activities are linked to
overall quality of life (Mansell et al. 2002; Schalock 2004;
Tobin et al. 2014). The impairments in social interaction
and social communication, which are core features of ASC,
may thus be causing a lower overall quality of life relative
to level of insight (Gotham et al. 2014). Understanding
whether differences exist in social-emotional functioning
between people with HFA and people with AS may reveal
whether social interactions are experienced differently and
if we need to tailor support to people differently depending
on their ASC subgroup. Further examination of differences
between those with HFA and AS may therefore provide a
useful test case for the merits of the single ASC diagnosis
in DSM-5.
The present study aimed to examine whether (1) adults
with HFA versus AS differ in their drive to empathise with
others and (2) whether objective differences exist between
these subgroups in the ability to ‘read’ mental states in
others’ eyes. Sex differences were explored first to consider
the impact, or lack of impact, on the main comparisons.
The Extreme Male Brain theory of autism (Baron-Cohen
2002) suggests that any sexual dimorphism observed in
typical populations in empathy will be attenuated or
completely abolished (Baron-Cohen et al. 2014, 2015) in
ASC, so no difference in scores between males and females
with ASC were predicted in the present study. We pre-
dicted that HFA would be associated with greater diffi-
culties in these skills as a result of early developmental
language acquisition difficulties and the impact that lan-
guage has on social skills development (Ozonoff et al.
2000; Howlin 2003).
Methods
Participants
43 adults, aged 18 years or older, with HFA and 43 adults
with AS were selected for comparison from the Cambridge
Autism Research Database (CARD; http://www.autismre
searchcentre.com) were included in this study. Participants
with AS were selected at random, and stratified by sex in
order to ensure that both groups were matched. All partic-
ipants reported being diagnosed with either AS or HFA by a
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qualified professional (Clinical Psychologist or Psychia-
trist) using DSM-IV (APA 2000) and/or ICD-10 (WHO
1994) criteria at recognised clinics. Self-report of clinical
diagnoses has been shown to be very accurate, with
agreement as high as 98 %, in the ASC population (Auye-
ung et al. 2012; Daniels et al. 2012). Participants were
matched for intelligence using Raven’s Progressive Matri-
ces (Raven et al. 1997), a non-verbal measure of intelli-
gence, which confirmed the absence of a clinically defined
learning disability (IQ\ 70) in all participants (Table 1).
This is important in investigating AS-HFA differences as
previous inconsistent data appears to be highly influenced
by variation in IQ (Witwer and Lecavalier 2008).
Measures
The Empathy Quotient
Participants completed the Empathy Quotient (EQ; Baron-
Cohen and Wheelwright 2004), a 60 item self-report
questionnaire designed to measure how easily a person can
pick up on other people’s feelings and how strongly they are
affected by other people’s feelings. The EQ therefore
measures both cognitive and affective empathy (Baron-
Cohen and Wheelwright 2004). Participants are required to
respond to each item by selecting one of four options:
‘strongly agree’, ‘slightly agree’, ‘slightly disagree’ or
‘strongly disagree’. The EQ was developed and validated on
adults with both HFA and AS compared to a control group
and has been shown through confirmatory factor analysis to
have reliability of .93 (Allison et al. 2011). Test–retest
reliability of the EQ is also high, at r = .835 (n = 25,
p = 0.0001; Lawrence et al. 2004). The EQ is therefore
effective in measuring empathy and, as anticipated by the
social difficulties associated with ASC, people with ASC
consistently score significantly lower on the EQ than people
without an ASC do (Baron-Cohen et al. 2014, 2015).
The ‘Reading the Mind in the Eyes’ Test
Participants were also compared on the ‘Reading the Mind
in the Eyes’ Test: Revised Edition (Eyes Test; Baron-Cohen
et al. 2001), a 36 item advanced test of emotional recog-
nition requiring theory of mind and social sensitivity. The
Eyes Test measures a participant’s ability to determine
complex emotional states from limited information, without
context, and is a performance measure of empathy. Partic-
ipants are required to look at a picture of a person’s eyes and
select one of four words that best describe what the person
in the picture is feeling. The Eyes Test was developed and
validated on a combined group of adults with either HFA or
AS compared to typically developed controls. Vellante et al.
(2012) meta-analysis demonstrated that the Eyes Test has
good internal consistency, a = .70 (Dehning et al. 2012),
and a = .77, using Guttman’s split-half method (Serafin
and Surian 2004). Test–retest reliability for the Eyes Test
has also been shown to be fair, ICC = .65 (Vellante et al.
2012). Finally, The Eyes Test demonstrates diagnostic
sensitivity between people who are typically developing
and people with either HFA or AS (Baron-Cohen et al.
2001). This is important as it indicates that the test measures
some of core features of ASC and therefore is key to
understanding differences between HFA and AS.
Procedure
Once registered with the CARD, participants completed the
research centre’s standard registration questions. The
questionnaire asked for basic demographic information
including age, sex, educational attainments, and employ-
ment status. Mandatory fields also include diagnosis,
diagnostic method, and comorbid conditions, while general
screening questions assessed specific research study
inclusion and exclusion criteria, such as medication. Par-
ticipants then navigate to and selected tasks from the online
test battery, completing as many as desired. Each task is
preceded by the appropriate instructions and participants
are able to log in and out as often as they wish.
As required by the ethical approval for the Cambridge
Autism Research Database, local ethical approval was
obtained from the University of East Anglia Faculty of
Medicine and Health Sciences Research Ethics Committee
to gain access parts of the CARD, including the target
measures. The dataset was manually searched to ensure
that required information (sex, age, diagnosis and Ravens
Progressive Matrices data) were available, and that the
target measures were complete. Participants with missing
data were excluded. This reduced the full dataset of eligible
participants from 99 individuals with HFA and 955 indi-
viduals with AS to 43 individuals with HFA and 446
individuals with AS. For comparative purposes a random
sample, stratified by sex and matching the HFA group
(male n = 20, female n = 23), of 43 participants (male
n = 20, female n = 23) was drawn from the AS group.
Statistical Analysis
The data, EQ total scores and accuracy scores from the
Eyes Test, were analysed using SPSS (SPSS Inc.) software
Table 1 Participant demographics
N M age (SD) M IQ (SD) N male N female
HFA 43 39.09 (13.05) 18.91 (1.74) 20 23
AS 43 37.95 (12.52) 18.91 (1.74) 20 23
Total 86 40 46
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version 18, and inspected for departures from normality.
The data were not normally distributed, and therefore,
groups were compared using the Mann–Whitney U test.
For all comparisons the converted z-score, rather than the
U score, is reported so that the results may be readily
compared against critical values of a normal distribution. A
supplementary analysis using logistic regression, which is
not sensitive to departures from normality, was also con-
ducted, using variables that significantly differed between
the two groups, in order to explore whether these variables
predicted clinical group membership.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
The number of men and women within each group was
matched. There was no significant difference in age
between the HFA group and the AS group, z = -.039,
p = 969 (Table 1). There was no significant difference in
IQ, as measured by Raven’s Progressive Matrices (Raven
et al. 1997), between the HFA group and the AS group,
z = -.056, p = .955. In fact, although minimal non-sig-
nificant differences were observed across gender—diag-
nosis comparisons, on a whole group by group comparison
the HFA and AS groups were found to be identical on
mean IQ.
Exploratory Analyses
Sex Differences
There was no significant difference in EQ total score
between adult men and women with HFA, z = -.610,
p = .542 or between men with AS and women with AS,
z = -.403, p = .687. Similarly, no significant difference
was observed on the Eyes Test between men and women
with HFA z = -.403, p = .687 or between men and
women with AS, z = -.817, p = .414.
Empathy
No significant difference was found between adults with
HFA and adults with AS in how they reported their abilities
to empathise with others, as measured by the EQ,
z = -.926, p = .335.
Emotion Recognition
The ability to accurately interpret complex emotional states
from expressions in the eyes was explored between groups
using the Eyes Test accuracy scores. Adults with AS were
significantly better at correctly interpreting complex emo-
tions than adults with HFA, z = -2.367, p = .018,
Cohen’s d = .47 (Fig. 1; Table 2).
Supplementary Analysis
A significant difference was found in scores on the Eyes
Test between adults with HFA and adults with AS. A
binary logistic regression was conducted to explore the
extent to which scores on the Eyes Test could predict group
membership. Performance on the Eyes Test significantly
predicted group membership, v2(1) = 4.728, p = .030,
with 59.3 % of cases being accurately predicted, and an
observed odds ratio of Exp(B) = 1.068, 95 % CI [1.004,
1.137].
Discussion
This study set out to examine whether there were any
difference on measures of empathy between two diagnostic
categories on the autism spectrum, AS and HFA. No sig-
nificant difference was observed in self-reported drive to
empathise between adults with HFA and adults with AS,
matched for age, sex, and IQ. In contrast, adults with AS
were significantly better than adults with HFA at correctly
interpreting complex emotions in others’ eyes. This
observed difference in performance showed a moderate
effect size and significantly predicted group membership,
albeit with a modest predictive accuracy of 59.3 %, and
odds ratio of 1.068, which is small. No significant
Fig. 1 Mean and spread of Eyes Test scores for adults with HFA and
AS. Thick lines represent the mean scores, the spread of data within
the upper and lower quartiles is represented within the box, and
vertical lines represent the full range of scores from the highest to
lowest values. Outliers are represented by circles
J Autism Dev Disord
123
differences were observed between males and females
within the HFA and AS groups on any of the tasks. The
overall poor performance observed among participants
with both HFA and AS on the EQ and Eyes Test is con-
sistent with previous research (Barnes 2012; Baron-Cohen
et al. 2001; Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004; Fabio
et al. 2011; Lai et al. 2011, 2012) and supports the mind-
blindness theory of autism (Baron-Cohen 1995). No sig-
nificant difference was observed in the reported ability and
drive to empathise, measured by the EQ, between adults
with HFA or AS and thus difficulties in empathy may be
further confirmed as a unifying feature of ASC in adults.
A previous study reports that children with HFA have
greater difficulties with theory of mind skills than children
with AS (Paynter and Peterson 2010), a difference that was
not readily apparent on the EQ in the present study. It is
important to note that the lack of difference in self-reported
empathy ability does not solely depend on theory of mind
skills, as the EQ measures both cognitive and affective
empathy; however this difference in child and adult use of
theory of mind skills is interesting and there are a number
of possible explanations as to why this difference might
exist. Some research suggests that the cognitive and
behavioural phenotypes associated with ASC are more
pronounced in childhood than in adulthood (Howlin et al.
2004). Children with AS, whose language development
follows closer to typical trajectories, may have a greater
intellectual or linguistic abilities, which enables the faster
development of theory of mind skills, than children with
HFA who have the additional complications of language
delay and associated comprehension difficulties (Howlin
2003). It could therefore be hypothesised that the lack of
difference in this skill in adulthood reflects a narrowing of
the developmental gap in seen in child populations, a
hypothesis that is also supported in neuroanatomical
research (Lai et al. 2015). This finding is also linked to the
construct of theory of mind, which is a developmental skill
and so changes over time (Scheeren et al. 2013). If this is
the case, children with HFA specifically may benefit from
increased support around developing this skill to better
understand social and emotional interactions. Longitudinal
studies are needed to test this hypothesis.
In contrast to the EQ result, a significant difference was
observed between adults with HFA and adults with AS in
their ability to correctly interpret complex emotional states,
measured by the Eyes Test. This suggests that non-con-
textual theory of mind skills are significantly more
impaired in adults with HFA compared to adults with AS.
The results also indicate that the Eyes Test has some sen-
sitivity to distinguishing between potential clinical sub-
groups, although it is not a diagnostic test and it is
important to note that the predictive accuracy is low. To
our knowledge, this is the first evidence for a difference in
this profile between adults with HFA and those with AS.
Social learning theories highlight the importance of emo-
tion, within social interactions, in facilitating social learn-
ing (Treur and van Wissen 2013). Facial expression
mimicry during social interactions also enhances social
coordination and improves quality of relationships (Hess
and Bourgeois 2010). As adults with HFA were less able to
correctly interpret complex emotional states in others than
adults with AS, it is likely social interactions may be more
challenging for people with HFA. This group may there-
fore need increased social support.
No significant differences were observed between men
and women with either HFA or AS, on any of the measures
used in this research. This lack of sex difference has
recently been replicated in larger samples (Baron-Cohen
et al. 2014). Within typically developing populations,
women perform significantly better than men on the Eyes
Test, a difference which does not exist in ASC populations
(Baron-Cohen et al. 1997, 2014). This is also the case on
Table 2 Means and medians of main comparisons
HFA (n = 43) Male (n = 20) Female (n = 23) AS (n = 43) Male (n = 20) Female (n = 23)
M age (SD) 39.09 (13.05) 44.85 (12.15) 34.09 (11.90) 38.56 (11.92) 41.25 (11.68) 36.22 (11.89)
M RPM* (SD) 18.91 (1.74) 19.50 (0.69) 18.39 (2.20) 18.91 (1.73) 18.90 (1.37) 18.91 (2.04)
Measures M (SD)
EQ 16.91 (10.22) 15.65 (8.91) 18.00 (11.33) 17.98 (8.86) 17.75 (10.14) 18.17 (7.81)
Eyes Test 20.09 (7.66) 19.35 (8.78) 20.74 (6.67) 23.53 (7.00) 24.35 (6.72) 22.83 (7.31)
Median (range)
EQ 14.00 (46) 12.00 (37) 17.00 (45) 16.00 (46) 22.50 (36) 21.55 (32)
Eyes Test 22.00 (29) 21.00 (29) 23.00 (23) 25.00 (32) 25.50 (24) 25.00 (31)
RPM = Raven’s Progressive Matrices, EQ = Empathy Quotient, Eyes Test = Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test
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the EQ (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright 2004; Baron-Co-
hen et al. 2014). The lack of sex difference on the EQ and
the Eyes Test among adults with ASC replicates previous
research exploring behavioural differences between men
and women with ASC (Lai et al. 2011; Wheelwright et al.
2006). However, as far as we are aware, this is the first time
that this sex similarity has been observed on these mea-
sures in discrete HFA and AS groups. This finding across
groups indicates that the reduced empathising profile is
seen in a similar way in adults with HFA and adults with
AS. This suggests that the between-groups difference
observed on the Eyes Test relates to a fundamental dif-
ference between these clinical populations as it is not
influenced by sex differences.
The results of this study raise a number of questions
about the most clinically helpful way of conceptualising
HFA and AS. The significant difference observed between
adults with HFA and adults with AS on the Eyes Test is of
particular relevance to the debate over whether the condi-
tions should be conceptualised as separate subgroups with
overlapping features, as they are in ICD-10 (WHO 1994),
or as not having qualitative differences, as they are in
DSM-5 (APA 2013). It could be hypothesised that the
atypical language acquisition seen in children with HFA,
but not in children with AS, leads to difficulties in early
social interactions that in turn lead to a weaker ability in
identifying complex emotions among adults with HFA,
observed in the present study. Longitudinal studies com-
paring the trajectories of language and social skills devel-
opment in relation to complex emotion recognition
between children with AS and children with HFA would be
beneficial.
The Eyes Test has known neuroanatomical correlates
including the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the left medial
frontal cortex, the superior temporal gyrus, and parts of the
amygdala (Baron-Cohen et al. 1999; Holt et al. 2014;
Richell et al. 2003). If differences exist between adults with
HFA and adults with AS on this task, it may reflect
underlying neuroanatomical or neuro-functional differ-
ences between the conditions. This area of exploration is in
its infancy (Lai et al. 2015; McAlonan et al. 2008; Yu et al.
2011) and more studies exploring functional and structural
differences between HFA and AS neuroanatomy may help
to explain differences in the presentation of the conditions.
Based on the results of this study, combined with the
neuroanatomical correlates of the Eyes Test, one hypoth-
esis is that HFA and AS differ in the neurological areas that
underpin the ability to interpret emotional states. This may
mean that differences in abilities between the conditions
are more canalised, i.e. they are fundamental characteris-
tics of the populations that are not altered by individual
variation, and may explain why the results of the Eyes Test
were shown to be predictive of clinical group.
The discrepancy between results on the EQ and the Eyes
Test is interesting from a clinical perspective. Self-report
of perceived abilities to empathise on the EQ showed no
difference between adults with HFA and those with AS.
The Eyes Test, an objective measure of the ability to
interpret what another person is feeling based on their
expression, showed a significant difference between
groups, with adults with HFA performing significantly
worse than adults with AS. This performance difference
suggests that, as well as having greater difficulty inter-
preting complex emotional states in others, adults with
HFA may have less insight into this area of social difficulty
than adults with AS do. Adults with HFA are not reporting
the additional difficulties on the EQ that we may expect
given the observed skill difficulties on the Eyes Test. The
implications of a possibly reduced insight into social skill
difficulties among adults with HFA need to be considered
further in future studies.
The difference between subjective and objective reports
of empathy is an area that has been increasingly identified in
research across typically developed populations (Devlin
et al. 2014; Realo et al. 2003). Devlin et al. (2014) refer to
the difference between perceived and actual skills as a
‘belief-ability gap’. In the present study, the observed dif-
ference between groups at the behavioural, rather than the
self-report level, may also by hypothesised to reflect greater
difficulties with mentalizing the self in adults with HFA.
Mentalizing refers the ability to think of the experiences of
the self and others in interpersonal contexts (Fonagy and
Bateman 2006). Lombardo et al. (2007) have observed that
individuals with ASC who are more self-focused are better
at mentalizing. One hypothesis, therefore, is that individuals
with HFA are less self-focused that those with AS and so it
is a difficulty in mentalizing that means self-reported
empathy is less aligned with actual performance. Further
studies in this area are clearly needed.
This study has a number of strengths. First, it contributes
to an area which has not received much attention; the direct
comparison of social and emotional functioning between
adults with HFA and adults with AS. This study also
considered both objective and subjective abilities of adults,
which has allowed for a practical consideration of the
differences between subgroups. Second, the lack of sig-
nificant difference in IQ between subgroups is important as
the reliability of the HFA deficit finding is improved by the
removal of general intelligence as a confounding variable.
Third, the EQ and Eyes Test have undergone substantial
reliability tests and have excellent psychometric properties
(Allison et al. 2011; Dehning et al. 2012) although the
comparatively weaker, yet still fair, test–retest reliability of
the Eyes-Test (ICC = 0.65) should be noted. Overall
reliability was, however, enhanced by sufficient sample
sizes with sufficient statistical power (Cohen 1988).
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Many participants registered with CARD have com-
pleted in-person testing for research projects and thus have
received confirmatory diagnosis using the Autism Diag-
nostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al. 2000),
Autism Diagnostic Interview (ADI; Lord et al. 1994), or
DSM-IV diagnostic criteria. Other participants registered
through the CARD self-reported a diagnosis. Self-report of
official diagnosis within the ASC populations is highly
reliable (Auyeung et al. 2012; Daniels et al. 2012), and
only participants who had been able to provide information
with regards to where and how they received their diag-
nosis were included in the current study. Nevertheless, the
validity of the findings would have been further enhanced
if all participants had their diagnostic sub-group indepen-
dently confirmed with a standardised diagnostic tool.
While the main comparisons provide a useful insight
into the similarities and differences between emotional
processing across HFA and AS, additional explorations of
how factors such as verbal IQ (VIQ) or socio-economic
status impact on the findings may have provided interesting
data and alternative interpretations of the results. The lack
of VIQ data means that the question of whether VIQ can be
eliminated as a confounding variable in this study cannot
be definitively answered. The results therefore need to be
interpreted with some caution, however, the validity of the
findings is enhanced by the groups being matched on
general intelligence. Furthermore, while previous studies
have suggested that the cognitive profiles associated with
HFA and AS may be distinguished by VIQ (e.g. Planche
and Lemonnier 2012), there are equal studies that show no
VIQ differences between groups (e.g. Spek et al. 2008).
The inconsistency in these data suggests individual varia-
tion in cognitive profiles, not easily unified into associated
diagnostic categories, which reduces the potential of a
between groups VIQ confound. Additionally, both the EQ
and the Eyes Test require a significant amount of language
comprehension for completion and both were validated on
a mixed group of adults with AS and adults with HFA,
without impact on the psychometric properties of the
measures being identified. Finally, given the language
demands of the EQ and the Eyes Test, if VIQ differences
between groups existed, difficulties in completion across
both tasks would be expected in the HFA group, and this
was not observed. Further studies that include a compar-
ison of VIQ impact may, however, help to enhance our
understanding of these observed differences between HFA
and AS.
This study found that adults with HFA are significantly
more impaired than adults with AS at correctly identifying
complex emotional states in others, using the Eyes Test. To
our knowledge, this is the first time this difference has been
observed. While it is not possible to draw broad conclu-
sions from a single study, the findings suggest a difference
between groups and a need for the subtleties in presentation
between HFA and AS to be considered further, so that any
impact on everyday life can be understood and support can
be tailored appropriately. Future studies exploring the
impact of language on social-emotional functioning
between these groups are indicated and differences
between cognitive and affective empathy should be
explored further. While the diagnostic conceptualisation of
ASC remains complex, the differences observed here
highlight a possible beneficial role of some subgrouping
within ASC.
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